By Sallieu S. Kanu
The Institute for Legal Research and Advocacy for Justice (ILRAJ) has raised alarm over Sierra Leone’s proposed Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2025, warning that several provisions could entrench ruling party dominance and undermine democratic stability.
While the Bill focuses on electoral reforms and promises broader constitutional reviews later, ILRAJ argues that it echoes historical patterns of manipulation, notably the 1978 shift to one-party rule. In a fragile post-conflict context where economic hardship and political tensions remain high, the institute cautions that such amendments risk eroding public trust and perpetuating instability.
Constitutional Purpose Undermined
ILRAJ stresses that a constitution should safeguard the rule of law, ensure separation of powers, and act as a social contract fostering unity in Sierra Leone’s ethnically diverse society. It must also guarantee electoral integrity to enable peaceful transitions of power—critical for attracting investment and achieving sustainable development.
However, ILRAJ warns that amendments tailored to secure electoral advantage for incumbents undermine these purposes. With 60% of Sierra Leoneans living below the poverty line and youth unemployment exceeding 70%, the institute says manipulation of the constitution could alienate citizens, fuel disillusionment, and invite unrest.
Electoral Commission Reforms
Clause 1 of the Bill renames the Electoral Commission and introduces stricter qualifications for commissioners, alongside a diverse Search and Nomination Committee. While this partially aligns with past Tripartite recommendations, ILRAJ criticises the omission of explicit non-partisanship safeguards, such as bans on recent political party membership.
Without such protections, ILRAJ warns, the Commission could be captured by partisan interests, eroding confidence in electoral processes and exacerbating political polarisation.
Independent Presidential Candidates
Clause 7 allows independent presidential candidates, provided they demonstrate financial capacity and community support. ILRAJ acknowledges this as a potential break from the dominance of the SLPP and APC, but warns that vague criteria could be exploited to impose prohibitive barriers.
By deferring thresholds to subsidiary legislation, the Bill risks reserving the presidency for wealthy elites or establishment-backed figures. ILRAJ points to African precedents: Namibia’s modest requirements encourage inclusivity, while Rwanda’s high deposits have been criticised for limiting competition.
Proportional Representation
Clauses 4–5 and 13 delete Section 38A, which gave the President discretion to impose temporary proportional representation (PR), and amend Section 74 to formalise PR. ILRAJ warns that these changes could skew electoral outcomes and entrench ruling party dominance.
The institute notes that the Bill ignores Tripartite Recommendation 78, which called for a national dialogue on electoral systems. By imposing PR without consensus, ILRAJ argues, the government risks marginalising opposition voices and repeating historical patterns of constitutional manipulation.
Presidential Election Threshold
Clause 7 repeals the longstanding requirement that presidential candidates secure 55% of the national vote to win in the first round. Instead, victory would require a simple majority plus at least 20% of votes in two-thirds of districts.
ILRAJ notes that while this change aims to reduce frequent run-offs, as seen in 2007 and 2018, it risks producing presidents with fragmented mandates. The institute warns that population disparities across districts could allow smaller, loyalist strongholds to override national majorities, undermining popular sovereignty. This, ILRAJ argues, deviates from post-1991 reforms designed to ensure legitimacy after the authoritarian one-party era of 1978.
Removal of President and Vice-President
Clauses 9 and 12 introduce new grounds for removing the President and Vice-President if expelled from their political party, subject to a two-thirds parliamentary vote. The provision seeks to clarify ambiguities highlighted in the 2015 dismissal of Vice-President Alhaji Sam Sumana.
ILRAJ, however, warns that this measure could be weaponised in Sierra Leone’s polarised Parliament, allowing ruling majorities to engineer expulsions and oust executives. The Cowan Constitutional Review Commission had recommended that such matters, particularly concerning the President, be resolved through public referendum to safeguard legitimacy.
Judiciary Role and Petition Timelines
Clause 7 enhances the Supreme Court’s role in election disputes, requiring rulings within 14 days and mandating the Chief Justice to notify the Electoral Commission if no petition is filed. While this could reduce delays, ILRAJ criticises the three-day filing window for petitions as “unrealistically short.”
Comparisons with Kenya (7 days) and Nigeria (21 days) highlight the risks of limiting opposition parties’ ability to gather evidence. ILRAJ also warns that assigning notification duties to the Chief Justice blurs the separation of powers and may compromise judicial neutrality.
Fixed Election Dates
Clause 16 repeals Section 87(1) of the 1991 Constitution, fixing parliamentary elections for the second Saturday of November every five years. ILRAJ acknowledges that fixed dates provide predictability but warns that November’s proximity to holiday periods could undermine diligence in tallying and reduce participation.
Past elections in March (2018) and September (2007) deliberately avoided festive seasons and weather disruptions. ILRAJ argues that ignoring recommendations for March–May dates risks logistical challenges and lower turnout.
Entrenched Provisions and Referendum
Clauses 15 and 16 amend entrenched Sections 85 and 87 of the 1991 Constitution, which require heightened scrutiny and approval through national referendum. ILRAJ stresses that any claim these provisions are non-entrenched is “fundamentally inaccurate,” warning that bypassing referendum safeguards would erode Sierra Leone’s democratic framework.
Acknowledging Progress, Warning of Risks
ILRAJ recognises the Bill’s stated intent to strengthen electoral integrity, promote gender inclusivity through measures such as the 30% quota for women nominees, and introduce procedural certainty. The institute commends these efforts as part of Sierra Leone’s hard-won democratic progress since the end of the civil war in 2002.
However, ILRAJ stresses that the Bill deviates sharply from consensus-driven recommendations made by the Tripartite Committee in 2024 and the Cowan Constitutional Review Committee in 2016. These deviations, it argues, perpetuate vulnerabilities exposed during the disputed 2023 elections, where allegations of manipulation, opacity, and institutional bias eroded public trust, triggered opposition boycotts, and drew international condemnation.
Existential Threat to Democracy
ILRAJ warns that unless amended, the Bill risks becoming a veiled mechanism to entrench ruling party power, echoing the authoritarian precedents of the 1978 constitutional amendments that imposed one-party rule through coercion and suppression.
The institute highlights that provisions such as fixed election dates in November—close to end-of-year holidays—could compromise electoral integrity, while attempts to amend entrenched constitutional sections without proper referendum safeguards threaten the very foundations of Sierra Leone’s democratic framework.
Call for Transparency and Consensus
ILRAJ concludes that reforms must be grounded in transparency, inclusivity, and adherence to established recommendations. It urges lawmakers to prioritise national dialogue and consensus-building to ensure that constitutional amendments empower citizens rather than entrench political elites.
“Without substantial amendments,” ILRAJ warns.
ILRAJ insists that reforms must be grounded in inclusive national dialogue and adherence to historical consensus from the Tripartite Committee and Cowan Constitutional Review processes. The institute outlined nine core recommendations to safeguard democracy and rebuild public trust.
Key Recommendations
- Ensure Non-Partisanship – Introduce explicit neutrality requirements, cooling-off periods for former politicians, and bans on party affiliations to prevent executive capture.
- Fair Access for Candidates – Embed clear, non-discriminatory criteria in the Constitution, including modest refundable fees and reasonable signature thresholds (7,500–10,000 voters across districts), with mandatory public consultations.
- National Dialogue on Electoral Systems – Require multi-stakeholder dialogue or referendum before finalising a mixed PR-FPTP system; allow parliamentary or judicial approval for constituency delays.
- Stronger Presidential Thresholds – Align with Tripartite Recommendation 53 by requiring 50%+1 nationally and 25% in two-thirds of districts, with population-weighted adjustments to protect voter equality.
- Safeguards on Removal of Executives – Defer clauses on presidential removal to a referendum; add safeguards such as proven misconduct and judicial review to prevent partisan abuse.
- Fair Petition Timelines – Extend filing periods to 7–10 days and rulings to 21 days; remove the Chief Justice’s notification duty to preserve judicial independence.
- Practical Election Dates – Shift elections to March–May to avoid holiday and rainy season disruptions, with flexibility for exceptional circumstances under parliamentary oversight.
- Compliance with Entrenched Provisions – Enforce Section 108 requirements, including Gazette publication, super-majority votes, and binding referendums with voter education.
- Inclusive Pre-Legislative Hearings – Conduct hearings with civil society, opposition, and experts; defer contentious provisions to broader constitutional reviews and public referendums.
Conclusion
ILRAJ warns that without these safeguards, the Bill could erode democratic foundations and entrench ruling party dominance, echoing Sierra Leone’s troubled constitutional history. The institute urges Parliament to act decisively to protect the country’s fragile democracy.