By Brigadier General (Rtd) JS Kaimapo
The recent approval for the establishment of a State Protection Service to protect the President and other VIPs has generated widespread debate across the country. While every sovereign state has the responsibility to protect its leaders, the creation of a parallel security outfit outside the traditional framework of the military and the police carries serious implications for national stability and institutional cohesion.
Erosion of Confidence in Existing Institutions
For decades, the military and police have constitutionally carried the responsibility of safeguarding the state and protecting senior government officials. Creating another force with similar responsibilities may create the perception that existing institutions are either unreliable or politically untrustworthy.
Such perceptions can weaken morale within both the military and police, particularly among personnel who have dedicated years of service to the nation. In any country, weakening confidence in established institutions gradually weakens the broader national security framework.
Institutional Rivalry and Divided Loyalty
Parallel security structures often create competition for authority, operational control, intelligence access, and political loyalty. Instead of cooperation, rivalry may emerge between the new outfit and existing security institutions.
Experience from Nigeria offers an important lesson. The Nigerian National Guards were established with responsibilities centered on the protection of VIPs and strategic state interests. Members of the National Guards underwent full conventional military training and were expected to proceed to Israel for specialized protection and security training.
However, when General Sani Abacha assumed power, the National Guards were eventually disbanded and absorbed into the regular military because their existence as a parallel force increasingly generated concerns over institutional rivalry and divided loyalty. Since they had already undergone full military training, integration into the armed forces became the practical solution.
This experience demonstrates that parallel security institutions, even when created with good intentions, can eventually generate concerns over supremacy, command authority, and political alignment.
Political and Economic Concerns
Sierra Leone remains politically sensitive, with national issues often viewed through ethnic and regional lenses. The establishment of another security outfit may therefore generate public suspicion regarding its true purpose and recruitment patterns.
At the same time, the financial burden of creating and maintaining another security institution is enormous. Recruitment, training, salaries, logistics, accommodation, and operational equipment all require substantial state resources at a time when the country continues to battle economic hardship, unemployment, poor healthcare, and infrastructural challenges.
Operational Challenges
Effective national security depends on unity of command and seamless coordination among security agencies. The existence of another armed institution with overlapping responsibilities may create operational confusion during national emergencies or civil unrest.
Conflicting chains of command and unclear operational boundaries can weaken response capabilities and undermine national security effectiveness.
Lessons from Sierra Leone’s Past
Sierra Leone’s civil war history should remain a reminder of the dangers associated with fragmented authority and parallel security structures. During the conflict, the emergence of the civil defence forced alongside the regular military created areas of operational conflict and competition for supremacy.
Tensions frequently arose between the civil forces across the country and the regular armed forces over authority, operational control, intelligence sharing, and battlefield recognition. This rivalry generated mistrust and infighting within the national security structure at a time when unity was critically needed.
The experience demonstrated the dangers associated with multiple armed structures operating within the same national space without clear institutional harmony. Sierra Leone must therefore be cautious about creating another security outfit that may unintentionally reopen old patterns of rivalry and fragmentation within the security sector.
Conclusion
The protection of the President and senior government officials is unquestionably important in every sovereign state. However, national security reforms should strengthen institutional unity rather than create competing centers of authority.
Sierra Leone’s long-term peace and democratic stability depend not on the multiplication of armed institutions, but on the professionalism, neutrality, and cohesion of its existing security framework.